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Research topic

Dollarization & Emerging Markets

Currency substitution, capital flows and monetary sovereignty in emerging markets.

Anchoring trust in money: innovation beyond stablecoins

Bank for International Settlements · 2026 · Report · BIS Annual Economic Report 2026, Chapter III

The BIS's flagship annual report argues that stablecoins as currently designed fail to deliver the singleness, elasticity, and integrity of money, and that the path forward is tokenising central bank and commercial bank money on unified ledgers rather than relying on private stablecoins.

Key findings
  • Stablecoins operate without the institutional underpinnings — central bank backing, guaranteed par redeemability, and an elastic supply of liquidity — that give money its singleness.
  • Stablecoins on permissionless chains, with pseudonymity and unhosted wallets, create AML/CFT and financial-integrity gaps and regulatory-arbitrage risk.
  • Fragmentation across multiple blockchain networks undermines the interoperability and network effects needed for money-like functionality.
  • Modelling suggests the net macroeconomic effect of widespread stablecoin adoption is modest, but reserve composition matters: government-bill holdings pose different financial-stability risks than bank deposits or central bank reserves.
  • In emerging markets, foreign-currency stablecoin adoption threatens monetary sovereignty and can erode the domestic currency's unit-of-account role if substitution deepens from store-of-value into transaction settlement.
  • The recommended path is to integrate tokenisation into the regulated two-tier system via 'unified ledgers' hosting tokenised central bank reserves, commercial bank deposits, and other supervised private monies.

Stablecoins and Fragility in Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes

Brandon Joel Tan · 2026 · Working paper · IMF Working Paper WP/26/144, Western Hemisphere Department

A global-games model of how dollar stablecoins affect parallel FX markets under fixed or managed exchange rates: stablecoins both widen access to foreign currency and create a common public price that can coordinate runs, so their welfare effect is state-dependent — beneficial when misalignment is low, destabilising when it is high.

Key findings
  • Under rationed foreign currency, the true degree of exchange-rate misalignment is unobserved; traditional parallel markets reveal it only imperfectly because information is dispersed across private bilateral trades.
  • Stablecoins both widen access to dollar-like claims outside the official allocation system and create a visible, high-frequency common price that aggregates order flow in one venue.
  • In the model, stablecoin market depth determines the precision of a common public signal about misalignment — producing a state-dependent welfare effect.
  • When misalignment is low, access and allocation gains dominate and stablecoins raise welfare.
  • When misalignment is high, a more precise public price compresses belief dispersion and synchronises exit, so a coordination externality can trigger runs and overturn the access benefit.
  • This supports a state-contingent policy: preserve low-cost access in normal states, but use temporary, targeted measures to manage large or run-like flows when misalignment is high.

Essays in International Finance

Julian Fernandez Mejia · 2024 · Working paper

The work explores the determinants and consequences of foreign exchange rate fluctuations on the economy, focusing on interest rate parity deviations and capital flow responses. It investigates stablecoins as a means to streamline transactions and mitigate volatility.

Key findings
  • Exchange rates influence trade dynamics and the vulnerability of economies to external shocks.
  • Stablecoins are designed to streamline transactions and overcome volatility constraints of traditional exchange rates.
  • The research reveals the sensitivity of both traditional and electronic currencies to external and internal factors.

The Rise of Digital Money

Tobias Adrian, Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli · 2019 · Report · IMF FinTech Note No. 19/01

Introduces a taxonomy of money and argues privately issued digital money (e-money / stablecoins) could rapidly displace bank deposits.

Key findings
  • Proposes a taxonomy distinguishing e-money/stablecoins from bank deposits and central-bank money.
  • Adoption of e-money could be rapid via network effects and erode bank deposit funding (disintermediation).
  • Coins the risk of 'digital dollarization' in economies with weak currencies.